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STATE OF UTAH 
DYNAPAC, INC., a Utah corporation, 
and TRACY COLLINS BANK AND TRUST 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
-.,. Plaintiff-Respondent, 
r, • •; ; - V S - ; , . y - , : : . _ j I ,,-.v .':: :<;';"•• • .;;,:'~ 
INNOVATIONS, INC., a Utah 
corporation, JOHN CUNNINGHAM, 
and ROBERT E. OVERTREE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant moves to set aside the default judgment 
entered against him in the court below on the grounds that an 
agreement existed between appellant and counsel for respondents 
not to take a default judgment until notice was given to appel-
lant, that service of process was fatally defective, that no 
evidence as to the sum for which appellant was allegedly liable 
was presented to the court to support any judgment. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Respondents obtained a default judgment against the 
appellant. The appellant appeared and moved to set th<= flpfanlf 
) . . . : , . 
) 
) • . . :; - -
) 
) Case No. 14243 
I 
) .'-,, V=, - : 
) -" . 
) '• : • . . , : - , , ; 
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judgment aside and to quash the original service of process upon 
appellant, and for leave to file a proposed Answer to contest 
the allegations of the Complaint on their merits. The Honorable 
Stewart M. Hanson, Sr., presiding in the lower court, first granted 
the Motion, then on a rehearing on an Amended Motion to Set 
Aside, together with a Motion to Quash, denied both Motions. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to reverse the denial by the lower 
court of the Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment and the 
Motion to Quash Service of Process filed by the appellant, and 
to have appellant's proposed Answer filed and to proceed with a 
trial on the merits as to the allegations of respondents • Com-
plaint. • * • ' - • - -' 'l-
STATEMENT OF FACTS . 
The Complaint of the respondents was filed on December 
7, 1973, (R. 106-119), the first claim of which alleges only 
that the appellant and the defendant Cunningham, upon the default 
of certain payments by the defendant Innocations, Inc., had the 
obligation to endorse all of their stock to the American National 
Bank to be held pursuant to escrow instructions referred to as 
Exhibit "C'\ which was alleged to be attached to the Complaint, 
but, in fact, is not attached to the Complaint. Also said claim 
alleges liability on the part of appellant growing out of the 
signing of Exhibit "B". Exhibit "B" (apparently a modification 
agreement at p. 119) is attached to the copy of the Complaint, and 
names appellant as a party, but said Exhibit shows no signature 
or contractual duties or obligations on the part of appellant. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The only duty that the second claim for relief alleges on the 
part of appellant is that he jointly, along with the defendant 
Cunningham, would endorse all of the stock that each had in ^ 
Innovations, Inc., in the custody of American National Bank in 
the event of default of a certain obligation by the defendant, 
Innovations, Inc. An allegation of default by Innocations, Inc., 
upon said obligation is made in the First Claim for Relief. In. 
the Second Claim for Relief an allegation is made that Cunningham, 
appellant and Innovations, Inc., have refused and now refuse tol 
deliver 94% of the stock of Innovations, Inc., to Stokermatic. 
No allegation therein is made of the reasonable value of this : 
stock; however, an allegation is made that Cunningham and appel-
lant are "liable to Stokermatic for payment of the amount owing 
pursuant to the agreement." ••:•;. ^-;:i :
 { • » *; . - .. 
• Referring back to the "Agreement", there is no allega-
tion that appellant is liable in any way on Exhibit "A" attached 
to plaintiff's Complaint, and none of that portion of Exhibit "B" 
attached to its Complaint describes any obligations by appellant 
as a party thereto. r A' a.L r : • :* .> .1: fr 
Likewise, in the First Claim for Relief, no allegation 
is made that appellant had any other obligation under the Modi-
fication Agreement other than to transfer and deliver 94% of the 
outstanding stock of Innovations, Inc. No allegation is made 
therein that the agreement provides that appellant was to be 
personally liable for a debt of Innocations, Inc., in the event 
of default of the defendant Innovations, Inc. Likewise, in the 
Second Claim for Relief, no allegation is made that the appellant 
had an obligation to pay the debts of Innocations, Inc. In the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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event of failure to transfer the stock, appellant's liability is 
limited to that "owing pursuant to the agreement." The Third Claim 
for Relief alleges only liability on the part of the defendant 
Cunningham. : :-•/! r,•-.:;:.;:-... ?-;* ,•..> _:•..••.•- . . . . 
1
 : •' - In the Fourth Claim for Relief an allegation is 
vmade that appellant, along with Cunningham, used the corporation 
for the purpose of defrauding Stokermatic without specifying in 
r-what. way any kind of a fraud was committed. The Fifth Claim for 
Relief of plaintiff refers to the allegations of the First Claim, 
then makes the bare allegation that Cunningham and appellant .. 
personally guaranteed payment of Innovations, Inc.'s obligations 
to Stokermatic but makes no claim that the guarantee was in writ-
ing. The Sixth Claim for Relief makes the allegation that the 
defendant Cunningham and appellant wrongfully obtained the stock 
certificates of Innovations, Inc., in question from American 
National Bank, and makes a further allegation that defendants 
are liable to Tracy or to Stokermatic for the value of the stock 
as of the date the certificates were released. ": :- :^-v.;--.!. 
The Sixth Claim is a claim for unjust enrichment 
of the defendants, making the allegation that "the reasonable 
value of the benefit to the defendants is unknown, but will become 
known during the course of this action." ^ . / r > ^ ; J 
The prayer of said Complaint asks for Judgment 
in the name of Stokermatic in the sum of $38,890.81 plus interest 
" at the rate of 1 0 % per annum, and for the plaintiff Tracy Collins 
Bank & Trust Company for the return of certain shares of stock 
of Innovations, Inc., or in the alternative, the value of that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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stock as of October 23, 1969. All of the foregoing were
 ;. ; 
abstracted from the Complaint, (Record 106 to 119). 
v \ ; o •;•<• The Affidavit of Service by a deputy marshall 
in the County of Los Angeles shows service on the appellant at 
4067 Cody Road, Sherman Oaks, California, and makes no mention 
of endorsing upon said Summons the date served or said marshal's 
name and title (R 104 R 105). Defendant, John Cunningham, 
was served on February 26, 1974, (R 103). The defendant,; 
Cunningham, moved to dismiss plaintiff's Complaint on March 
15, 1974- (R 86, 87 and 88). A default certificate as tov. 
appellant only was filed on the 25th, of March, 1975, (R 85) .
 ; 
On May 19, 1974, the plaintiff's attorneys, Gordon Roberts 
and William Crawford, appeared before the Honorable Judge Hal • 
.Taylor. The only action taken was that of plaintiff being 
granted a Judgment as prayed against the defendant, Robert E. 
Overtree (R 84). No documentary proof was offered, submitted 
or withdrawn and there is no indication that any person was 
sworn to testify with respect to the value of stock or any other 
matters. The formal Judgment was entered by the Court on the 
:17th day of May, 1974, in the sum of $43,444.67, and it is 
recited in the Judgment that said Judgment was entered against 
said defendant, Robert E. Overtree,"pursuant to prayer of 
Complaint on file herein." (R 81) Thereafter on May 24, 1974, 
the defendant, John Cunningham's, Motion to Dismiss was continued 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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without date (R 76). Thereafter on June 17, 1974, a Default 
Judgment was entered against the defendant, Innovations,•Inc., 
in the sum of $43,761.27, also (R 70). Thereafter on August 8, 
1974, defendant, Cunningham's, Motion to Dismiss was continued . 
without date, on stipulation and motion of defendant's counsel, 
counsel for neither party being present (R 68). Thereafter on 
August 19, 1974, the defendant, Robert E. Overtree, moved ; 
the Court, pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, for an Order setting aside the Default Judgment on :.: 
the grounds and for the reason that Judgment was entered errone-
ously and because of mistake, inadvertence, surprise and excusable 
neglect together with an Answer denying various matters along with 
various affirmative defenses (R 64) together with an Affidavit, ; 
(R 61) which sets forth essentially that the defendant, Overtree, 
was served on or about the 24th day of January, 1974, and referred 
the matter to an attorney in Utah, Delwin Pond, with instructions 
to file an Answer, and about thirty (30) days thereafter learned 
that Mr. Pond had neither filed an Answer nor handled the matter 
any further. Whereupon the Affiant called the attorney for the : 
plaintiffs, Gordon Roberts, and requested an extension of time in 
which Mr. Overtree was to obtain counsel to file an Answer on his 
behalf, during which conversation Roberts stated to him that before 
any default would be entered, that Mr. Roberts would give him 
notice of his intention to take a Default Judgment (R 62). On the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 




3rd day of September, 1974, appellant's Motion to Set Aside 
the Judgment came on and was continued to September 9, 1974, 
at 2:00 P.M. (R 58). On September 6, 1974, an Affidavit was 
filed by Gordon L. Roberts for Respondents (R 54 55) in which 
Mr. Roberts admits having a telephone conversation with Mr. —, 
Overtree at a time after the entry of the, "Default," but before, 
entry of the Default Judgment as follows: "Wherein Mr. Overtree 
was advised by affiant that default had in fact been entered, 
but that the Default Judgment had not yet been entered. Affiant 
did advise Mr. Overtree that before entry of a Default Judgment 
there would be further communication." (R 54 55 emphasis added) 
Subsequent to that telephone conversation, Roberts was con-
 ; 
tacted by Sumner J. Hatch, an attorney in Salt Lake City, State 
. of Utah,, and was advised by Mr. Hatch, that he had been retained 
to represent appellant. Approximately two (2) weeks passed 
and no action was taken, so the affiant called Sumner J. Hatch.
 f 
to ask whether any action was to be taken. Mr. Hatch advised 
: affiant that he had not received a retainer which he had .: f 
.  ^ requested from Mr. Overtree, and that as far as he was concerned, 
he was not representing Mr. Overtree any further. Roberts then 
advised Mr. Hatch that he intended to enter Default Judgment 
inasmuch as a substantial time had elapsed since the entry of 
the default. : ' 
This affidavit shows that at no time did 
Gordon Roberts further communicate with appellant or any person 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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actually representing appellant that Roberts intended to take a . 
Default Judgment against -appellant'as Roberts had said that he would 




 c;:/ : Appellant's Motion to Set Aside the Default 
Judgment then came on on September 9, 1974, and was granted by a 
Minute Entry (R 53) V Thereafter, on the 10th of October, 1974, .. 
defendant, Cunningham1s,:Motion to Dismiss was stricken, and an x 
Answer was filed by defendant, Cunningham, on October 15, 1974 
(R 4 5 ) . . : -:"'-' •' r.K HIS-' '•••• -::-r •;-• J.?*.-' : ^ — > . T • :. ;*:; ; . - * 
''.''™.:': J„ '~J^':1 '•'",'/..-V:l.J-r_ _.""-;• . On..December, 18, 1974, the trial court . 
signed an Order (R! 42) reciting that the Motion of appellant : 
was re-heard on stipulation of counsel, and then nullified the -;• 
Minute Entry and ordered appellant's counsel to file an Amended ! 
Motion withiri five (5) dayk. Thereafter/ on -December 26, 1974, an 
Amended Motion to Set Aside was filed listing as grounds that 
Overtree had an understanding with plaintiffs1 counsel that further 
communications from said counsel would be had before a default was 
to be entered, and no such communication was made, that no written 
agreement to guaranty any obligation of the defendant, Innovations, 
Inc., was ever introduced into evidence, that no testimony was 
adduced at the default hearing to prove any unliquidated sum claimed 
by plaintiff as to the defendant, that service of process should 
be quashed because of failure to comply with Rule 4 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, and further that the defendant had a good and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Thereafter, on April 2, 1974, a Motion to 
Quash Service of Process for failure to comply with Rule 4 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was filed together with a 
true copy of the copy of the Summons actually served on 
Overtree (R 34). Both the Amended Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment and the Motion to Quash were heard on April 30, 197 5.. 
On August 1, 1975, an Order was entered denying defendant, 
Overtree1s, Motion to Set Aside, thereafter, a Motion to Amend 
the Order of August 1, 1975, was filed on August 8, 1975, which 
was by Minute Entry denied on August 14, 1975. Thereafter, this 
appeal ensued. . . - . . -
THE COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO ENTER 
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST APPELLANT BECAUSE THE RETURN OF 
SERVICE FOR THE SUMMONS AS WELL AS THE COPY THEREOF SERVED UPON 
APPELLANT DID NOT COMPLY WITH RULE 4(j) OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE., . .,. , •..-..-> . • . - • . . . ,, •. ,.....,.,.... 
.„;..,..,..:... Failure to comply with Rule 4(j) of the Utah. 
Rules of Civil Procedure is jurisdictionally defective as to a 
Judgment entered against a defendant based upon such a return. 
The requirements of service of a Summons enunciated in Rule 4(j) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure existed previously in the 
statutory law of Utah under sec. 104-5-7, Utah Code Annotated 
(1943), and was adjudicated for the first time in Thomas v. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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District Court, 110 U 245, 171 P2d 667 (1946), wherein it was 
admitted by the defendant that he had been served with a copy of 
the summons upon which no date whatsoever was placed as required by 
said section. The trial court denied the'defendant1s Motion to 
Quash Service of Process and gave the defendant two (2) days in " 
which to plead. On Appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the ' 
trial court on the sole ground that the person serving the Summons 
had failed to endorse upon the copy or copies he shall deliver to 
the defendant at the time of service, the date upon which the same 
w a s s e r v e d . ' " •'-••"•: •••. *•' -'- *: " ••*>•••.. - \-v :^ .^ -.^ .. • v-:...^ >. •..;•.;JK_.;-. v«y. 
The Court, in this opinion, carefully noted 
several' cases' involving irregularity in the service of the Summons, 
and the argument by the plaintiff that the defendant must affirma-
tively show that he was mislead by the failure to follow the statute. 
"Such is not the provision of the Statute," replied the Court. The 
case law which had been decided at the time of the 'Thomas*''decision 
stood for the proposition that where there was a statutory requirement 
for the wording of a summons or for the service of a"summons, and 
such requirement had not been followed and could not be cured by, 
amendment, that service of process must be quashed, and any Judgment 
upon which such a defective service is based is void. See Columbia 
Trust Co. v. Steiner, 71 U 498, 267 P 788; Grant v. Lawrence, 37 U 
450, 108 P 931, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 280; Wasatch Livestock Loan v. ' 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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District Court, 86 U 422, 46 P2d 399; Winters v. Hughes, 3 U 443, 
24.P 759;,Miller v. Zeigler, 3 U 17, 5 P 518; State Tax Commission 
v. Larsen, 100 U 103, 110 P2d 558; Reese v. Judges 52 U 520, 
175 P 601; James v. Jensen, 50 U 485, 176 P 827; Glasmann v. . . , . 
District Court, 80 U 1, 12 P2d 361. 
, The wording of sec. 104-5-7 of the Utah Code 
Annotated 1943 at the time of the Thomas decision was as 
follows: ',.'v •'=••/
 t... -,*••*• , :• :-r«-
"Any officer, or other person authorized 
to serve a summons, who serves the same, shall, 
at the time of the service thereof, endorse upon . ... 
the copy or copies of such summons which he shall 
.. - deliver to the defendant or defendants in such •. . 
action the date upon which the same was so served, 
• ..
 t and sign his name thereto, and add, if an officer, 
his official title." (Emphasis added.) 
The foregoing statute was repealed in 1951, and the following 
wording was adopted for Rule 4(j) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure: 
"(j) TIME OF SERVICE TO BE ENDORSED ON COPY. 
At the time of service, the person making such .
 t .- - ^ . 
service shall endorse upon the copy of the summons 
left for the person being served, the date upon 
which the same was served, and shall sign his name 
• thereto, and, if an officer, add his official 
title." (Emphasis added.) 
The principal announced in Thomas has been 
followed by the Utah Supreme Court in cases since the adoption 
of Rule 4(j) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rees v. 
Scott, 8 U2d 134, 329 P2d 877 (1958); Utah Sand & Gravel v. Tolbert, 
16 U2d 407, 402 P2d 703 (1965); .Woody v. Rhodes, 23 U2d 249, Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-12-
461 P2d 465 (1969; Martin v. Nelson, U , 533 P2d 897 (1975). 
-• -
:
 , • ..'V". On March 29, 1972, the Utah Supreme Court 
amended many of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; however, no 
amendments were-made as to Rule 4(j). If any synthesis could be 
drawn from all of the cases cited as to service of summons, it would 
be that from the Thomas case where the Court, quoting from a Michigan 
case at p. 671: ''-"•'' " -'-'- i -- :. r •• ; • :- -••••- -• -•••• 
"It is the general rule, that, if a k 
statute prescribes a method for service of 
'" ' process, the method must be followed." 
There is no dispute in the record that the requirements of Rule 4(j) 
were neither attempted or met, nor did the return of process show 
that they were. Therefore, under the cases above, the Third Judicial 
District Court did not have jurisdiction over the defendant, Robert E. 
Overtree, at the time that it entered the Default Judgment on May 17, 
1974. It necessarily follows that the Court below erred in denying 
the Motion to Quash Service of Process and Motion to Set Aside 
Default Judgment filed by appellant. *-~ ' L '''".' ^ 
i i-.-Ji:^^:™^..:..«^-.THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN ITS DENIAL OF 
~r % , -: • : c : ' * . -' - . - _j; . _; '* 
THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT OF THE DEFENDANT, 
BECAUSE ADEQUATE GROUNDS WERE SHOWN PURSUANT TO RULE 60(b) OF THE 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
The record below shows that the plaintiffs proceeded 
against the two individual defendants for a debt of a corporation 
and for the alleged joint liability of the two individual defendants 
- --*-- — -p-n in>-QQ fn act. Cunningham, the other 
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individual defendant in the instant case, v/ho had signed the first 
agreement between the parties, had filed a Motion to Dismiss 
the plaintiff's Complaint in this matter which had not been dis-
posed of at the time of the first hearing upon the Motion to Set 
Aside of the defendant, Overtree. Interrogatories filed by the 
defendant, Cunningham, on June 4, 1975, had not been answered by , 
the plaintiffs even as of the date the defendant, Overtree, filed 
this Appeal. :
 r - .- . _ v .; 
,, .,... The Affidavits of Roberts and Overtree reveal that 
the only real conflict between their versions of what occurred is 
that Overtree says that he called Roberts about thirty (30) days 
after the service of the Summons and Complaint upon his. Roberts 
says that it was after March 25, 1974, which was the day upon 
which the Default Certificate was entered as to Overtree. There 
is no question but what Roberts admits by his own Affidavit that 
he agreed to give Overtree notice prior to taking a Default -
Judgment; however, Roberts says that he told Overtree that his 
"default" had already been entered. To a layman, it is submitted 
that the word, "default," would be a meaningless term. The words, 
"default judgment," are the words that really matter, and these 
are the words which Roberts used when he told Overtree that notice 
would be given to Overtree prior to a Default Judgment being 
taken. Thereafter, the record shows that although Roberts told 
an attorney that the plaintiff would take a Default Judgment against 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Overtree, that attorney had just told Roberts that he did not represent 
Overtree'. It would have been a simple matte'r for Roberts to have 
then sent a letter to Overtree advising the defendant that the plain-
tiff intended to take a default; however, Roberts failed to take any 
such action then went to the Court and applied for a Default Judgment 
against Overtree, which was a breach of the agreement that he had 
made with Overtree, ••-•*--:*'• •• .•*•*• " • /;;.„". . :\... 
Such conduct on the part of an attorney 
toward a layman, is reprehensible because it shows lawyers as 
a profession as being sharp dealers, not persons of their word, and 
ready to take advantage "of a layman. It can be said in answer to 
such a charge that Overtree should have reatined another attorney 
when he learned that the attorney for the corporation, Pond, had • 
not filed an Answer. However, that is what Roberts should have told 
Overtree, rather than to have made an agreement which he did not 
honor. The legal profession is increasingly being scrutinized by 
consumer groups and legislative bodies in recent years, the Courts 
and Bar Associations should enforce fair dealing between lawyers and 
laymen. If not, these institutions may lose the control they have 
to the legislature. These are cogent reasons to include such con-
duct by a lawyer to a layman under Rule 60(b) (7). 
The law in Utah has always been that 
where the Court is in doubt as to whether to set aside a default, 
that doubt should be resolved in favor of a trial on the merits. 
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In^Utah Commercial and Savings Bank v. Trumbo, 17 U 198, 53 P 1033 
(1898), the ...defendant' s attorney withdrew without filing an 
Answer because the defendant failed to.pay.his fee because the. 
defendant did not ..receive the attorney's letters asking for 
such fees. ...There was. no arrangement made with plaintiff's. 
counsel by the defendant and. plaintiff's counsel had not made 
any statements to the defendant as to notice before a default , 
as.in.the instant case. The trial court refused to set aside 
the default judgment and the Utah, Supreme Court on Appeal . ,... 
reversed the.trial court, holding such a ruling to be an abuse .. 
of judicial.discretion saying of that discretion:,.. ... , • . ... .. * 
.,: "It is. an impartial legal discretion,, which .  .,. ^ ._ 
cannot be employed to the injury of any subject, 
.... . but must.be exercised fairly, reasonably, and .',s ....,, 
in accordance with the established principles 
.„of law. The power of the court to set aside 
judgments by default is recognized and con-
ferred .in section 3005,,Rev. St, 1898, and , .,..
 r. ,,_.-. «* / , 
should be liberally exercised, for the pur- ** 
_....., pose .of,.directing proceedings and trying 
causes upon their substantial merits; and 
_ where the circumstances which led to the
 lr ... 
default are such as to cause the court to 
hesitate, it is better to resolve the doubt _ .. ,...„._
 : ., 
'in favor of the application so that a trial 
- .. - may be secured.on the merits." (Emphasis added.) .
 w 
> - s
 r . The rule announced by this. Court in, Trumbo .... r., 
has been followed by this.Court and has.not been over-ruled. 
Security Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Henry E. West, Jr., 20 U2d 
292, 437 P2d.214 (1968); Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 
14 U2d 52, 376 P2d 951 (1962). While these cases represent 
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facts when the motion was filed within the three-month period of 
Rule 60, this Court has always recognized the need for setting aside 
a default for good cause in cases where the motion was not filed 
within three (3) months such as in the case of Ney v. Harrison, 
5 U2d 217, 922 P2d 1114 (1956), where "the motion to set aside the 
judgment by the wife of a defendant who had answered and was con-
testing the case on its merits was granted even though eleven (11) 
months had lapsed from the default judgment to the motion to the 
motion to set aside and the reason that the wife had not'answered 
is that she felt that a divorce decree between her husband and 
herself would protect her. In the instant case, the Affidavit of 
the defendant, a resident of California, which was filed with the 
Motion to Set Aside was dated the 6th day of August, 1974, within 
the three-month period, and the motion itself was filed only two 
(2) days after the running of the ninety-day period. 
* I . T h e trial court upon the first hearing, 
granted the motion then for some reason, changed its mind, because 
of some alleged delay on the part of the defendant. Yet, from the 
record,'it is easily seen that in every case where there was a 
delay of time after the filing of the motion of the defendant, 
Overtree, the plaintiffs filed further Affidavits supporting their 
contention in the matter; Nothing is said by the Court about the 
delay of the plaintiff -in getting a re-hearing of the motion of 
this defendant from the 9th of September to the 17th of December, 
r
- *- *-^  ^ininallv, 
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set aside the judgment, then as more grounds stated for the motion 
of the defendant the trial court changed its position one-hundred-
and-eighty degrees. The only progress made further in the case 
against the other personal co-defendant, Cunningham, was the 
filing of Interrogatories and the Request for a Trial Setting on 
March 5, 1975. If the trial court had granted the motion of the. 
defendant, Overtree, the trial of the matter would not have been 
delayed as it had not been set for trial. 
•, • -r .- The result of the change of mind by the trial 
court and denial of the appellant's Motion to Set Aside is to 
allow the defendant, Cunningham, whose liability is,.from the 
pleadings and agreements attached thereto, more primary than 
that of the appellant, to have his day in court on the one hand 
and on the other hand to clamp a rigid judgment of. $43,444.67 ~ 
without any trial on the merits at a time when the granting of , 
such a motion would not have delayed any trial. , 
. The proposed Answer of the appellant denies various 
allegations of the Complaint as well as alleging affirmative 
defenses vhich if proved would be meritorious defenses to the
 ; » 
action. In addition, the Answer of defendant alleges that the 
Complaint does not state claims against the appellant upon which . 
relief can be granted. The Complaint, in the First and Second 
Claims alleges that the appellant based upon a "modification 
agreement" which is incorporated into the Complaint but not :—
 : 
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attached thereto as alleged, failed to endorse and deliver certain 
stock to American National Bank as a trustee to be held pursuant 
to the terms of an escrow agreement alleged in paragraph 7d, which 
is alleged to be attached to the Complaint, but not so attached. 
No other right to said stock by any of the plaintiffs to said stock 
is alleged. It is submitted that such allegations are defective 
because the agreements alleged to be incorporated by reference are 
not attached to the Complaint. The Third Claim for Relief makes 
no allegations as to Overtree. The Fourth Claim for Relief alleges 
fraud, but does not allege specific acts as required by Rule 9(b) 
of the Utah" Rules of Civil Procedure. Such" a general allegation 
is not sufficient to state a claim in fraud. Price v. Union 
Pacific, 4 U 72, 6 P 528. The Fifth Claim for Relief alleges all 
of the allegations of the First Claim for Relief then alleges from 
those facts that the appellant and Cunningham personally guaranteed 
the obligations o£ Innovations, Inc., to Stokermatic. Such an " 
allegation flies' in the teeth of the agreements which are in fact 
attached to the Complaint, as said agreements delineate the' 
liability of the parties very carefully, and none of these agree-
ments containwords of guaranty. The Sixth Claim for Relief then 
without being pleaded in the alternative, conflicts with the First 
Claim for Relief and alleges that in fact Cunningham and the 
appellant did deposit 53,626 shares each with the plaintiff, ' 
American National Bank, here again alleging and incorporating ' : 
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Exhibits "C,r and "D" thereto, neither of which are attached to 
plaintiffs1 Complaint, and makes no allegation as to what the 
provisions of said escrow agreements were, nor does said claim ; 
allege a breach of said agreements, but simply alleges that the 
defendants "wrongfully or mistakenly" obtained said stock. As 
to an action on a written contract, such a claim is defective. 
Stephens v. American Fire Insurance Co., 14 U 265, 47 P 83; 
Stephens v. Continental Insurance Co. of New York, 14 U 272, 
46. p 1 1 1 8 . ......:..,,.
 ;, .,;•;.... 
The Seventh Claim for Relief is for unjust 
enrichment and must necessarily rest upon a wrong committed in 
breach of the escrow agreements incorporated by reference in the 
Sixth Claim, but not attached and not properly pleaded, or upon 
an alleged mistake. The general rule of law on restitution for 
unjust enrichment resulting from a mistake is that a demand must 
be made as a condition precedent to suit. See AmJur 1034, sec. 92. 
No such demand is pleaded in the Complaint, hence such a Complaint 
is defective as to unjust enrichment. Certainly, there is 
ample showing that the defendant has a meritorious defense to a 
Complaint defectively pleaded, in addition to those matters 
alleged in the Complaint. 
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° ' : - THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
THE MOTION OF APPELLANT*TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT BECAUSE 
NO EVIDENCE WAS INTRODUCED AT THE DEFAULT HEARING TO SHOW THE 
LIABILITY OF THE APPELLANT FOR THE VALUE OF THE CORPORATE STOCK 





 ;•''•'•'"" ° The main allegations of the Complaint 
which directly involve the appellant have to do with alleged lia-
bility based upon the value as of October 23, 1969, of certain 
corporate stock for which the plaintiffs make claim. No testimony 
was introduced at the default heciring and no allegation is made in 
the Complaint as to the value of said stock. A default judgment 
rendered upon an unliquidated claim must be established by proof 
on further proceedings, and until the amount is ascertained, there 
is no final judgment. Hurd v. Ford, 74 U 46, 276 P 908 (1929), 
cited also in Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 U 416, 260 P2d 741"* 
(1953) ? Freed v. Stoker, U , 537 P2d 1039 (1975). Rule 
55(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides for such 
proceedings. Without an allegation of a value in the Complaint, 
or proof thereof, any award by a Court is sheer speculation. 
' CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is respectfully urged 
that the trial court erred in refusing to set aside the Default 
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Judgment where the court entering the Default Judgment had no 
jurisdiction because of defective service of process; that 
adequate grounds were shown to set said Judgment aside because 
of misconduct of an attorney in dealing with a layman; the 
appellant has meritorious defenses to an improperly pleaded 
Complaint; and the Default Judgment against the defendant 
for an unliquidated claim the value of which is not alleged in 
the Complaint and is not based upon any evidence* Accordingly, 
this Court should set aside the Default Judgment against appel-
lant/ allowing appellant's proposed Answer to be deemed as filed 
and proceed to have this matter go to trial on its merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN L. McCOY 
Attorney for Appellant 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
